Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

1998

Deutsche Telekom, German Corporate Governance, and the
Transition Costs of Capitalism
Jeffrey N. Gordon
Columbia Law School, jgordon@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Business Organizations Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Deutsche Telekom, German Corporate Governance, and the Transition Costs of
Capitalism, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 185 (1998).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/3546

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu, rwitt@law.columbia.edu.

DEUTSCHE TELEKOM, GERMAN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND THE
TRANSITION COSTS OF CAPITALISM
Jeffrey N. Gordon*
THE TRANSACTION
In

November

1996,

Deutsche

Telekom

AG,

the

government-owned
German telephone company, sold
common stock representing approximately 25 percent of the
company in
a global stock
offering that raised

approximately DM 20 billion ($13 billion), the largest
equity offering ever in Europe.! In selling off this equity

stake, the German government (i.e., the Federal Republic)
had a number of motives. First, the sale was an important
step in converting a government-run telephone monopoly

into a nimble competitor in the emerging European and
world telecommunications market. In anticipation of a fully
competitive European telecommunications regime in 1998,
Deutsche Telekom ("DT") had been separated from

Deutsche Bundespost - Germany's postal, telephone, and
telegraph authority - as a private law stock corporation
owned 100 percent by the government.2 Sale of the initial 25
. Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Law and
Economic
Studies, Columbia University. This paper was prepared for the
Conference on Cross-border Views of Corporate Governance sponsored by
the Columbia Law School Sloan Project on Corporate Governance and
the L'Ecole Polytechnique Federale (Zurich), March 1997. The author
would like to thank David Blass and Christopher Kirkham for research
assistance, Mark Roe for innumerable conversations on German
corporate governance, David Charny and Katharina Pistor for comments
and suggestions, and the Sloan Foundation for financial support. © 1998
Jeffrey N. Gordon.
1 DEUTSCHE TELEKOM AG, Prospectus for the Offering of 85,000,000
Ordinary Shares in the form of American Depositary Shares 104, Nov.
17, 1996 (hereinafter, the "Prospectus").
2 The process of restructuring began in 1989 with legislation
that
separated the three main activities of the Bundespost,
telecommunications, postal services, and financial services into distinct
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percent tranche was the first stage of an eventual
privatization of the entire company. At the time of the
offering, DT's outstanding debt was approximately DM 110
billion ($73 billion),3 and a significant objective of the sale
was to recapitalize the company. During the 15 months
following October 1996, approximately DM 16 billion of
debt comes due, bearing an average interest of 6.6 percent,
that management intends to replace with the new equity.
Second, the sale was part of an effort to establish an
entrepreneurial culture at DT. This means downsizing the
workforce, from 230,000 at year-end 1994 to a targeted
170,000 by 2000 (through traditional German means of
attrition and early retirement rather than layoffs), and
reorganizing the business on functional lines. In addition,
approximately 3.3 percent of the offering, nearly one
percent of the company's equity, was sold to employees
under various preferential arrangements designed to
"increase employee identification" 4 with the company, a
particular challenge since nearly half the workforce are
tenured civil service employees whose salaries and benefits
are set by government regulation.
Further, a major objective of the offering was to promote
a "shareholding" culture among German citizens. There is
apparently widespread sentiment among political actors
that the system of bank-centered finance is hindering
businesses.
Gesetz
zur Neustrukturierung
des Post- und
Fernmeldewesens und der Deutschen Bundespost [Law on Restructuring
the Postal and Telecommunications Services and the Federal Postal
System] (PostStruktG), v. 8.6.1989 (BGBI. IS.1026) (F.R.G.) ("Post
Reform I"). In 1994, the second reform act made all three private stock
corporations. Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Postwesens und der
Telekommunikation Postneuordungsgesetz, 27.6. 1994 (BGB1. I S. 2325)
("Post Reform II"), and contemplated their privatization.
3As one sardonic banker stated, this amount of debt is greater than
the public debt of Turkey.
Prospectus, supra note 1, at 103. See Hans-Willi Hefekduser, Die
Deutsche Telekom AG - Von der 6ffentlich-rechtlichen zur privatrechtlichen Zielsetzung in Unternehmen der 6ffentlichen Hand, 25, ZEITSDRIFT
FOR UNTERNEHMENS UND GEsETTsCHAFsREcHT 385 (David Blass trans.,

1996) (on file with author).
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German economic development and thus the desire to
develop stock market channels for equity finance. Initial
public offerings are rare in Germany (only 10 in all of 1994),
and the stock markets are famously illiquid5 and volatile.6
Among other things, this makes it difficult to imitate the
U.S. pattern of high-tech development in which venture
capital specialists nurture a startup with an eye toward a
lucrative exit via an initial public offering. Banks are not
seen as very effective in performing the venture capital role,
so a shareholder culture might make possible alternative
modes of finance for potential sources of innovation and
growth.
Moreover, the grossbanken, in particular, have lost
credibility as monitors of managerial performance. The
failures have been spectacular: Daimler-Benz, in which
Deutsche Bank supported the company's costly move into
extensive unrelated diversification in the late 1980s (just at
the time when the U.S. takeover market was at high boil in
the effort to undo prior decades of unrelated
diversification); Metelgesellschaft, which showed a glaring
failure to monitor the financial risks of commodities
trading, presumably an area in which a bank would have
some special sensitivity; the collapse of the real estate
empire of Jurgen Schneider, in which escalating bad loans
suggested in-group bank myopia; and Klockner-HumboldtDeutz, in which a longstanding accounting fraud remained
hidden from a Deutsche Bank-led restructuring of the firm
5 In 1994, just three companies - Deutsche Bank AG, Daimler-Benz,
and Siemens AG - accounted for a third of the trading volume in
German public markets; the top six firms accounted for almost 50%.
Peter Gumbel, Cracking the German Market: The Hard Sell: Getting
Germans to Invest in Stocks, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1995, at A4.
6 Over the period 1975-95, the approximate ratio of average annual
nominal returns to risk (standard deviation) on German equity markets
was 8.6%/18%. See Charles Olivier, Unlocking Germany's $200 Billion
Corporate Pension Pot, EUROMONEY, June 1996, at A5; Euromoney
Survey, Guide to Germany 1996, Equities, EUROMONEY, June 1996, at A4,
Table 4. By contrast, German investors can earn a nominal yield of 7-8%
on a portfolio of government bonds and local mortgage bonds, with risk
below 6%. Olivier, supra.
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only two years earlier Apart from these highly visible
events, there also have been a number of academic studies
that challenge the efficacy of bank monitoring. Thus, the
development of a shareholding culture carries with it some
idea of injecting new voices in the monitoring of German
management and, even more important, shifting the focus
of finance and governance away from creditor claims to
equity claims.
This paper argues that the Telekom offering does not
take the idea of a shareholding culture very far. The key
idea is that finance and governance are jointly determined,
and that so long as the capital structures of German firms
are heavily leveraged (about which there may be factual
uncertainty), bank monitoring of managerial performance
with a creditor twist will persist. However, the previous
success of German "stakeholder capitalism," as opposed to
Anglo-American "shareholder capitalism," raises questions
about the introduction of a shareholding culture. Perhaps a
shareholding culture is a second best solution to a more
fundamental problem of an inflexible labor regime within
which firms must maximize; a superior solution would find
a satisfactory way to address the transition costs of labor
market change. Even without change to a shareholding
culture, or resolution of even harder issues of political
economy, however, it is possible to pursue a modest
corporate governance reform agenda that would use the
threat of shareholder damage proceedings to elicit more
diligent monitoring from the banks.

Some of these failures are described with particular vigor in
Ekkehard Wenger & Christoph Kaserer, The German System of
Corporate Governance - A Model Which Should Not Be Imitated 4-16
(Conference on Comparative Corporate Governance, Center for Law and
Economics, Columbia Law School, 1997) in COMPETITION AND
7

CONVERGENCE IN FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE GERMAN AND ANGLO-AMERICAN
MODELS (Stanley W. Black & Mathias Moersch eds., forthcoming 1998).
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DEUTSCHE TELEKOM AND THE SHAREHOLDING
CULTURE

-

AN INTRODUCTION

In many respects the Deutsche Telekom offering was a
great success on the road to widespread public ownership of
securities in Germany. Although the transaction was a
"global offering," two-thirds was eventually allocated to
German investors and institutions, approximately 40
percent of the total going to retail purchasers. More than
three million retail investors signed up to get information
on the issue, making the offering several times
oversubscribed.
Nevertheless, the Deutsche Telekom offering seems an
unlikely preparation for a shareholding culture. Indeed, it
may undermine one, both because it replicates public
shareholder passivity and sets unrealistic standards for
stability of value. The DT initial public offering is, of course,
only a partial privatization; the government holds 74
percent, making it the dominant shareholder. Under the
German Stock Corporation Law of 1965,8 a 50 percent
holder has the power to elect all the shareholder
representatives of the supervisory board9 and controls the
disposition of all other routine matters that come before the
shareholders meeting," including ratification of the acts of
the management board and the supervisory board. 1 A 75
percent holder has distinctive powers, including the right to
recall a member of the supervisory board 2 and to amend
the articles. 3 Many of these powers are subject to
alternative specification in the articles including capped
voting rights, but the DT Articles do not provide for any
such limitation.
8 Aktiengesetz, 1965 BGB1. I 1089, amended by 1994 BGB1. I 4 8

("AktG").
9

at §§ 101,
10Id.
Id. at § 119.

119.

" Id. at § 120(1), (2).
12Id. at § 103(1).
,3Id. at § 179(1), (2).

"Id. at § 134(1).
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Many aspects of the transaction assure that the
government will remain the dominant holder for a
substantial period of time, and that management is
substantially entrenched.15 The privatization legislation
restricted the government from further public stock sales
until 2000 to give DT priority on public market access.
Under pressure to meet the Maastricht budgetary criteria
for economic and monetary union, the government
subsequently decided to sell off a 25 percent stake in DT to
the state development loan agency, Kreditanstalt ffir
Wiederaufbau, which will eventually place the shares with
"strategic investors," including potential international
business partners, but not until 2000.16 Even after this sale,

issuance by DT of all of the remaining authorized but
unissued shares would still leave the government a 44
percent holder. Supervisory board members were elected
upon DT's formation in 1995; their five-year terms will
extend until 2000. The government also agreed to give the
management board a veto over its sale of shares to
"strategic investors." Moreover, the availability of a DM
0.50 per share discount for German retail investors was
conditioned on a purchase through a bank account, making
it likely that "public" share ownership has been folded into
the bank's proxy voting system. Thus, certainly in the near
term, DT is unlikely to present the occasion for significant
public shareholder involvement in serious governance or
control questions.
The offer has a number of unusual features designed to
encourage and sustain widespread public ownership. First,
the economics have been shaped in a way that will
minimize, at least in the near term, the volatility often
" The government's shares are held by the Federal Institute, which
appears to comprise the administrative apparatus of the Post Ministry.
'6 Ralph Atkins, Bonn in Deal to Sell 25% Stake in Telekom, FIN.
TIMES (LoNDON), June 27, 1997, at 2. The first part of this disposition,
amounting to a 13% block of DT, took place in December 1997 and
January 1998, at a sale price of $5.5 billion. KfW Pays DMlObn for 13%
Stake, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Jan. 6, 1998, at 22.
17 Prospectus, supra note 1, at 18.
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associated with equity ownership. In connection with the
offering, DT announced that it expected to pay a two
percent dividend in 1997 and a four percent dividend
measured against the offering price in 1998,18 a somewhat
remarkable undertaking for a company in the midst of a
fundamental business change. A substantial part of DT's
business is the monopoly provision of public fixed-link voice
telephony, which will be regulated by a new administrative
agency, the Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications
and Post (the "Regulatory Authority"). 9 A prospective
shareholder could well find in these arrangements an
implicit promise that the Regulatory Authority will set a
rate structure so as to permit payment of a regular dividend
regardless of the profitability of DT's other business
activities.
The offer also contains special incentives for widespread
share ownership, a DM 0.50 discount for share purchases
up to 300 shares and a special 1/10 share bonus for shares
continuously held for three years after the initial public
offering (up to 30 bonus shares). This presumably is based
on the experience of the Volkswagen privatization in the
1960s, in which public investors bought shares at a
discount and promptly resold them.
Finally, the stock exchange was pressured to give DT
disproportionate weighting in the DAX-30, which
will help
2
offering.
the
of
liquidity
and
price
support the
In any event, the offering has been sold and the stock
has been trading continually at a premium over the market
price, in the DM 30's to low 40's. But this is hardly the stuff
of which high-tech IPO's are constructed.

18

Prospectus, supranote 1, at 15-16.

19 Telekommunikationsgesetz
("TKG") S 66, v. 1.8.1996 (BGBI. I
S.1120).
2 Laura Covill, Telekom Rules OK, EUROMONEY, Dec. 6 1996, at 33.
The Stock Exchange Committee was persuaded to weigh the full amount
of DT's capital, not just the public float.
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THE BANKS' ROLE IN GERMAN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE -

SOME INITIAL QUESTIONS

From an American perspective, the distinctive feature of
German corporate governance is the role of the leading
German banks, which have representatives on supervisory
boards of most large publicly traded German firms, often as
Chair.2 1 This can be heralded as a potentially valuable22
mechanism for the monitoring of managerial performance
or questioned as the interference by risk-averse creditors
with the interests of risk-taking equity claimants.23 An
important basis for the banks' governance power is said to
be control over the overwhelming majority of votes cast at
the shareholders meeting. For example, in 1992, the banks
cast an average of 84 percent of all votes at shareholders
meetings of the 24 largest firms with a substantial public
float.24 The banks' direct holdings are substantial but rarely
controlling; similarly, bank-managed mutual funds add
only a relatively small amount to the banks' position. So the
most significant source of the banks' voting strength is said
to be discretionary authority over customers' shares on
deposit,25 which raises the question as to whether the banks
are exploiting the rational apathy of public shareholders.
This story seems to be missing a crucial piece of
information: a more detailed account of the actual owners of
the shares on deposit with the banks. Looking to the simple
percentage of bank votes may overstate bank influence
because that percentage reflects the mechanics of voting
See Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structures in
Germany, Japan and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927, 1938-41
(1993).
Id. at 1979-80.
23Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, CorporateGovernance and
Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan,
and the United States, 48 STAN. L. REV. 73, 90-96 (1995).
21

24 THEODOR BAUMS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS IN EUROPE DIFFERENCES

AND

TENDENCIES

OF

CONVERGENCE

Table 3 (Crafoord

Lecture, Univ. of Lund/Sweeden Working Paper 1996) (on file with

author).
2

Roe, supranote 21, at 1938.
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shares that are issued in bearer form. In order to vote, a
shareholder must either deposit the shares with the
company or give a proxy to a "credit institution," a
professional shareholders agent, or a shareholders
association. 26 Deposit of the shares with the company would
sacrifice the anonymity that apparently is an attraction of
bearer shares, so the deposit with a bank seems almost a
mechanical necessity. The real question is the degree of
discretion that the bank has over the shares that are voted,
by proxy.
The data on share ownership is fragmentary. Because
shares are issued in bearer form, a company itself will not
necessarily have a good sense of its owners, much less the
public. Although the Securities Dealing Act requires
disclosure of five percent blocks,"' this can be evaded
through private holding companies in which no party owns
a majority of the stock.28 Share ownership by households is

concentrated among a narrow group, only six percent as
opposed to 20 percent in the United States which suggests
holdings of relatively large blocks. More important, a very
large percentage of the stock of "public" corporations is held
through cross-holdings, and the estimates of their
significance range from 27 to 52 percent of the gross market
capitalization.2 ' The sheer arithmetic suggests that in many
26

See Deutsche Telekom AG, Articles of Incorporation § 19(1):

"Eligible to participate in and to exercise their-voting rights at the
shareholders' meeting shall be those shareholders who deposit ... their
shares at a cash office of the Corporation, with a German notary, [or] at a
financial institution operating collective security deposits. . . ." An
interesting aside: in response to a request for a copy of the articles, a DT
official and one of its law firms said the articles were "confidential."
Whatever the German practice, they were attached as an exhibit to the
U.S. Registration Statement for the offering of American Depositary
Shares.
27 Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz
[Second Financial Markets Promotion Act], 1994 Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil

I (BGBI. I) 1749 (F.R.G.), at § 21 ("WpHG").
' See Wenger & Kaserer, supranote 7, at 22-24.

29 Id.

at 24. For explorations of the disclosure rules and estimates of
ownership, see Marco Becht & Ekkhart B6hmer, Transparency of
Ownership and Control in Germany (European Corporate Governance
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cases a significant percentage of the votes cast by the bank
must be of large blocks held by sophisticated investors. As
to these shares, the bank's exercise of nominal discretion is
surely limited by the shareholders' knowing acquiescence in
the bank's decisions. A significant shareholder displeased
by a bank's strategy could revoke the proxy and vote
independently at the sacrifice of anonymity or deposit the
shares with another bank.
In other words, depending on the distribution of share
ownership, the banks' apparent discretion might be
significantly limited. Large blockholders would have -the
sophistication to monitor the bank's behavior and the
capacity to insist on bank voting that served shareholder
interests. Thus, insofar as the banks' influence depends on
shareholder voting, at least in some cases, the bank might
feel more constrained to pursue shareholder interests than
might initially appear. Further data would clarify this
question.
GOVERNANCE AND FINANCE
Bank monitoring of managerial performance raises three
kinds of potential objections, of which only two are curable.
One curable objection is that banks have been incompetent
at the job, at least recently, perhaps because of insufficient
attention or resources devoted to the task. Perhaps the
problem is that senior officials at Deutsche Bank serve on
or chair too many supervisory boards to do an effective job,
or that the banks' tradition of generalist monitoring needs
to shift to industry-specific skills. Another curable objection
is the problem of self-dealing; that the bank wants to
maximize the value of its relationship with the firm and so
may use its influence to increase interest charges and fees
at the expense of equity holders.
Network Working Paper, Oct. 1997) (available at www.ecgn.ulb.ac.be,
hardcopy on file with author); Peter 0. Mfibert, Banks' Equity Holdings
in Non-Financial Firms and Corporate Governance - The Case of
German Universal Banks (Working Paper, Aug. 1997) (on file with
author).
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The third objection, incurable if true, is that the banks
are structurally unsuited as monitors because of the
inherent conflicts between the monitoring of credit and
equity claims. Creditors and equity holders will have
different attitudes toward risk, since the creditors' claim is
capped on the upside (at full repayment) and the equity
holders claim is capped on the downside (by limited
liability).0 The managers have similar attitudes toward risk
as the creditors, but for different reasons. Creditors are risk
neutral (because they can assemble portfolios of loans), but
they resist risk because it may lower their expected
return.31 Managers are risk averse (because their entire
human capital investment may be tied up in a particular
firm) and so may resist risk even if it raises their expected
return. The similarity of attitude promotes an unholy
alliance between the banks and the managers against the
shareholders that undermines the firm's ability to
maximize equity values.32
But the force of this objection depends upon the capital
structure of the firm. Bank monitoring may be problematic
for a firm with a small amount of debt in the capital
structure, but it may be the ideal arrangement for a highly
leveraged firm. The shareholder/creditor conflict is, of
course, symmetric. In a highly leveraged firm without
creditor monitoring, shareholders would optimally pursue a
number of strategies that opportunistically shift value from
creditors to shareholders, in particular, asset substitution
into riskier projects. This is captured in the finance
literature by likening equity to an option held by
shareholders to buy back the firm upon full repayment of
the debt, or, in the alternative, likening equity to a put
option held by shareholders to sell the firm to debtholders
at the face amount of the debt. In the first scenario, the
30 John

C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: CorporateGovernance as a

Multi-Player
Game, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495, 1499 (1990).
1
3 1d. at 1501.
31 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory
of the Firm:
ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305, 328 (1976) See generally Coffee, supranote 30.
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shareholders gain value by increasing the volatility of
returns through riskier projects or increasing leverage. In
the second scenario, the shareholders gain value by
drawing cash out of the firm through dividend payments. In
the vicinity of insolvency, as the shareholder call option
moves out of the money, the shareholders may gain value
through the selection of risky negative net present value
projects.33 Thus, shareholder opportunism is controlled by
designating the banks as monitors, sustained by an implicit
understanding that the bank will exercise its voting power
to protect creditor interests. In the case of the highly
leveraged firm, the creditors are residual claimants and
thus, not surprisingly, exercise voting control.
One important question regarding the "fit" of bank
monitoring for German firms is the nature of firm capital
structures. The commonly repeated stylized "fact" about
German corporate finance is the heavy debt. This seems
consistent with the disparity between the total stock
market capitalization and GNP in Germany relative to
other OECD countries where equity plays a more important
role. For instance, stock market capitalization is 17 percent
of GDP in Germany, while it is 132 percent of GDP in Great
Britain. ' On the other hand, German firms allegedly
accumulate huge retained earnings that would certainly
reduce leverage in the capital structure.3 5
Thus, conditions of governance and finance are jointly
determined. There also may be a strong element of path
dependency. If background social, political, and economic
conditions produce a strong tendency to a characteristic
3
See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe
Communications Corp., 1991 WL 277613, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1099,
*1155 n.55 (Del. Ch. 1991).
' See Baums, supra note 24, at Table 2. See also Euromoney Survey,
supra note 6, at Table 1 (For 1995, 23.9% for Germany, 130.7% for Great
Britain). These comparisons may, however, reflect the relatively small
number of German firms that are publicly traded more than the debtequity ratio throughout German business.
BANKS, FINANCE AND
35 JEREMY EDWARDS & KLAUS .FISCHER,

INVESTMENT IN GERMANY (1994).
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financial form, then legal arrangements and customs will
develop that reinforce the existing pattern. Assume that at
some imaginary moment German firms were heavily
capitalized with debt, leading to a characteristic pattern of
bank monitoring. Subsequent equity investment would pay
a penalty because of the creditor focus of monitoring, so new
capital will tend to come in as debt capital, which reinforces
the governance case for bank monitoring. Alternatively,
even if equity increases as a percentage of firm
capitalization, the prior debt-protective
governance
mechanism may persist, despite the equity penalty.

DEUTSCHE TELEKOM AND THE SHAREHOLDING
CULTURE - A RECONSIDERATION
This bring us back to Deutsche Telekom and the
German government's ostensible desire to use this partial
privatization as the springboard for the establishment of a
shareholding culture. The questions, of course, are why
change? Why foster a strategy of equity finance that will
undoubtedly roil the harmony of reasonably well working
governance arrangements?
What's so great about
shareholder wealth maximization anyway?
Seen from an economic perspective, the goal of a system
of corporate governance is to maximize the economic value
of the firm, as measured by the total of economic returns for
all possible residual claimants. For instance, the goal is to
maximize the sum of the returns for shareholders, debt
claimants, and workers. The ultimate defense of the
assignment in the Anglo-American system of exclusive
governance rights to the stockholders rests on the
empirically contestable fact that this is how to maximize
the size of the economic pie.
For a long time the German experience suggested that it
wasn't necessarily the case. While returns to equity
investment in German firms have been significantly lower
than in the United States over the last 15 years, increases
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in labor productivity have been significantly higher."
Although precise comparisons of the sum of the returns are
quantitatively difficult, there is much suggestion of
equivalence: the growth rate of per capita GDP in Germany
exceeded the U.S. growth rate over a 40 year period, to the
point of GDP equality in absolute terms." Now, however, at
least some believe that significant gains depend upon a
different economic culture, of entrepreneurial risk-taking
induced by high-powered incentives like the equity rewards
under a regime of shareholder wealth maximization. As
discussed above, the partial privatization of Deutsche
Telekom hardly provides such a model; the public float is
less than 20 percent of the outstanding debt. Nevertheless,
as an example of the fund-raising potential of the Germany
equity markets, it is a significant moment. This is not a
statement about the competence of managerial monitors,
but a transitional moment in a debate about corporate
objectives.
GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE
TRANSITION COSTS OF CAPITALISM
Seen from afar, it appears that the effort to convert the
German system of corporate governance and finance is a
decidedly second best approach to a deep problem of
adjusting to a changing competitive environment. The
U.S.'s success in mastering the "New Economic Order" has
been based on flexible markets in products, corporate

"'See Le Defi Americain, again, ECONOMIST, July 13, 1996, at 21-22.
For example, the average return on equity for German firms in 1994 was
7.4%, half the average return for U.S. firms; the return on capital for
German firms between 1974-93 was only 7%, compared with 9% in the
United States. Average labor productivity in German firms, however,
increased at an annual 1.8% since 1979, twice the American rate of
increase. Id.
37 Stakeholder Capitalism: Unhappy Families, ECONOMIST,
Feb. 10,
1996,
38 at 23-24.
Id. at 25.
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control, and labor. 9 At this point, the most significant
difference between the United States and Germany is with
respect to labor markets, not control markets. In other
words, there may be nothing seriously wrong with the
German system of governance and finance, but rather with
the surrounding set of social institutions within which it
must pursue maximizing behavior.
Governments can pursue different strategies in
addressing the transition costs of capitalism." One
possibility is a protectivist strategy that seeks to impede
the transition in question, through trade barriers, for
example, or capital market controls.4 Another is a frankly
transitional strategy that looks to measures such as
grandfathering, retraining, and incentives for early
retirement.42 A third is simply to let the costs fall where
they may, subject to background conditions of social
insurance.4 3 The structure of the German labor regime
seems highly protectivist, one that will resist change in
staffing and compensation patterns. It also seems that the
existence of national bargaining will undermine the
possible advantages of changes in corporate governance and
finance at the firm level. Or perhaps the goal is to use new
pressure for firm specific adjustments, deriving from
shareholder culture, as a way of modifying the national
bargaining structure. In any event, the fundamental issue
is a basic question of political economy in which a
governance change is not the key event.
This is borne out by the tortured history of the failed
hostile takeover attempt of Thyssen AG by Fried. Krupp
AG Hoesch-Krupp ("Krupp") in the spring of 1997 and the
eventual combination of the two companies. Massive labor
" See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pension Funds, and the New
Economic Order, 97 COLuM. L. REV. 1519 (1997).
" See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employee Stock Ownership as a Transitional
Device: The Case of the Airline Industry, in THE HANDBOOK OF AIRLINE
ECONoMics
575, 576 (Darryl Jenkins ed., 1995).
41
id.
42
43

Id.

Id.
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and political opposition, rather than managerialist
manipulation of a failed corporate governance system, was
the key barrier to the hostile bid, and shaped the eventual
merger." Krupp initiated the struggle with a cash tender
offer to Thyssen shareholders at a 25 percent market
premium. Thyssen management of course objected
(particularly to the conflicting role of Deutsche Bank, whose
investment banking subsidiary advised Krupp, while one of
the Bank's management board members sat on the Thyssen
supervisory board). The most effective resistance, however,
was waged by the union leadership, goaded in part by the
Thyssen CEO's assertions that the takeover would lead to
heavy layoffs (at a time of 11 percent unemployment).
Labeling the hostile bid as a "Wild West" tactic, the union
leadership organized demonstrations of as many as 30,000
workers, and particularly focused them against Deutsche
Bank - a politically vulnerable target. In response to the
ensuing political pressure, Krupp called off the hostile bid.
Eventually, the firms entered into a "friendly" merger,
brokered in part by political leaders, in two stages: first, a
consolidation of their steel operations, and then an overall
merger of the two firms. But the critical element in putting
together these transactions was reducing the level of job
loss, not maximizing the value to shareholders. If the
outcome represents a "failure" (certainly contestable), it is
not principally a failure of the German corporate
governance system.
A MODEST GOVERNANCE REFORM AGENDA
Even if the major questions of political economy remain
unresolved, there seems room for a modest governance
" The account here is based on press reports, especially from the
European Wall Street Journal. See Matt Marshall, Thyssen, Krupp Opt
for 2 CEOs, Removing Barrierin Merger Talks, WALL ST. J. (EUROPE),
Jan. 12, 1998, at 3; Thomas Kamm & Matt Marshall, The Next Wave:
Global ForcesPush European Companies into Merger Frenzy, WALL ST. J.
(EUROPE), Apr. 4, 1997, at 1; Kristi Bahrenburg, Takeover Flop Dims
GermanShares' Sheen, WALL ST. J. (EUROPE), Apr. 2, 1997, at 12.
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reform agenda that will contribute value in regimes of
stakeholder maximization as well as shareholder
maximization. Many failures at the supervisory board level
involve no conflict between creditors and shareholders, just
a failure of diligence. In this regard increasing the power of
shareholders to call to account supervisory board members
and managing board members would be valuable. Although
German corporate law does not permit a shareholder
derivative suit, it does allow a 10 percent holder to demand
that the company pursue a claim for damages against such
board members for "violation of their duties,"45 including the
obligation to "employ the diligence of an orderly and
conscientious manager."4 6 Such liability, however, may be
extinguished by shareholder ratification.47 On the other
hand, if no damages are recovered, the shareholder is liable
for both the defendant's and the corporation's costs,4" a
significant risk for someone who has no voice in the
litigation and will recover only a pro rata share. Ten
percent is a very high threshold, especially in a large public
firm, that could be lowered, and the "loser pays" rule could
be eliminated altogether. Similarly, the requirement of five
percent share ownership or a DM 1 million stake as a
condition for presenting a resolution at the shareholders'
meeting49 seems like an overly stringent barrier.
It also seems possible to enhance the quality of the
supervisory board without major upheaval, through
changes in custom over the selection process. One possible
evolutionary path is for the supervisory board, under
pressure from foreign capital investment, to move more in
the direction of an American-style board, especially in the
attitude of directors. The question is whether more
energetic engagement by shareholder directors fits well
with a codetermined board.
45
4

AktG § 117(2).
§ 93(1).
§§ 93(4), 117 & 147.

1Id. at
4
7 Id. at
4SId. at
49

§ 147(4).

Id. at § 122(2).

